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Recent experiments show that synchronous events can
appear to an observer to occur at different times. Neural
processing time delays are offered as an explanation of
these temporal illusions, but equating perceived time
with processing time leads to some thorny
philosophical problems.
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Our sense of extension in space can be traced to the
orderly pattern in which receptors sample the retinal image,
but there is no equivalent orderly arrangement of recep-
tors designed to register temporal patterns. This makes
space perception and time perception different from the
outset, and renders mysterious the neural mechanisms by
which we sense the time course of events. We can judge
whether two events occur at the same time, or which of
two events occurred first, but these temporal judgements
are not universally reliable, particularly when the events
occur very close together in time. Psychophysical experi-
ments in which subjects were asked to report whether
reversals in colour of a patch of dots occurred at the same
time as reversals in the direction of movement found that
the motion changes had to lead the colour changes by
around 80 milliseconds for the two events to appear syn-
chronised [1,2]. This has led to the idea of a distributed
asynchronous consciousness, resulting from the neural activ-
ity in functionally distinct areas of the brain, each of
which spawns its own unique microconsciousness [3–6].
An intriguing new study by Arnold, Clifford and Wen-
deroth [7], recently published in Current Biology, finds that
measurements of the colour-contingent motion aftereffect
are also consistent with an average delay of 80 milliseconds
in motion processing.
The idea of functional specialisation of the human visual
cortex, originally based on reports of specific cognitive
deficits after brain damage [8], has in recent years been
confirmed by direct imaging of the functioning human
brain [9]. Our modern view of the brain is based on the
notion of a collection of interacting functional units. This
raises the question of how these modules give rise to our
inner experience, usually portrayed as that of single observer
looking out on an external world. There does not appear to
be any particular region of the brain that performs the
Figure 1
Green dots moving upwards and red dots
moving downwards do not seem to change in
synchrony. The changes in direction have to
precede the changes in colour by around
80 milliseconds to achieve temporal binding.
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function of gluing together or binding different attributes
of the scene. Indeed, the experience of being an undiffer-
entiated observer may itself be an illusion, as after brain
damage we can lose parts of our visual experience, such as
our experience of colour [10] or motion [11]. Nevertheless,
attributes of an object that change together appear to bind
together, perhaps because perceptual synchrony implies a
single common external cause.
As different attributes of an object are processed in differ-
ent parts of the brain, and the information arrives there
through different routes, it would be extraordinary if pro-
cessing of all object attributes took the same time.
Moutoussis and Zeki [1] recognised this and designed an
experiment to measure differences in perceptual time,
which they define as the time it takes for a percept to
become established in a particular cortical area. They
varied the colour of a set of dots on a computer monitor
between red and green while at the same time changing
the direction of motion between up and down (Figure 1).
The relative phase of the two changes was varied from trial
to trial, and subjects were asked to report the colour of the
upward moving dots. They found that the likelihood of
responding with the colour red, say, for downward move-
ment was greatest when the colour changes lagged behind
the motion direction changes by about 80 milliseconds. 
The idea that the time we attribute to an event is tied to
time at which the brain generates a representation of that
event raises some thorny philosophical problems [12]. In
the neural processing delay approach, which we call the
‘brain time’ theory, time is treated quite differently from
other sensory attributes. Current vision theory is grounded
on the idea that all visual information — for example,
spatial pattern, colour, motion, depth, surface properties or
object identity — is encoded in the activity of cortical
neurons, the input to which is traceable through a network
of neural connections to the sensory surface in the eye. The
data for these processes is the spatio-temporal pattern of
light on the retinae. Temporal perception may work in the
same way: we may have specialised neural systems that
encode the relative time of external events. We can call
this alternative the ‘event time’ theory.
Brain time theories can take two forms. In the explicit form,
relative time may be encoded by ‘metaneurons’ that are sen-
sitive to the time course of neural processing in the brain. It
is difficult to see the advantage of this approach. Problems
of temporal perception are simply passed to higher level
processes, in which distributed neural events remote from
the input, and therefore subject to various kinds of temporal
delay, are substituted for the events themselves. 
The alternative, implicit form of brain time theory is more
daunting, however. If our perception of the time of an
event is coded implicitly, as the time at which a perceptual
state of the brain is established — tantamount to the time
at which we become aware of the contents of the event —
then the medium of temporal sensory experience is no
longer physical, as it is for the other five senses, it is
conscious experience itself. In this theory, to make tempo-
ral judgments — for example whether colour changes
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Figure 2
The contingent aftereffect: after an observer
has adapted to alternating clockwise rotating
red patterns and anticlockwise rotating green
patterns, then static red patterns appear to
rotate anticlockwise and static green pattern
rotates clockwise. Arnold et al. [7]
manipulated the relative phases of the
changes in motion direction and colour during
adaptation in separate trials (shown on the
left), and then measured the direction and
magnitude of the contingent aftereffect. They
found that the pattern of adaptation, as a
function of the relative phase of the adapting
colour and motion signal, is biased overall,
suggesting that colour processing precedes
motion processing by around 80 milliseconds. 
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before motion direction — we have to compare two
microcon-scious experiences occurring in different parts of
the brain. There is a clear fundamental difficulty with this.
The implicit brain time theory requires a perceptual mech-
anism that is outside the neural substrate. Intriguingly,
this mechanism could provide a unique function for con-
sciousness: the encoding of temporal relations in distrib-
uted brain areas, something that would be difficult, or
perhaps impossible, to simulate in an artificial system. To
propose this mechanism, however, would be to advocate
breaking the link between neural activity and perceptual
experience on which all current perceptual theory is based.
In the Moutoussis and Zeki [1] procedure, the evidence
for errors in temporal binding comes from an observer’s
subjective reports of temporal order. These errors may
reflect differences in neural processing time, or they may
result from an imperfect specialist system for determining
the temporal properties of events [13–14]. The new work
of Arnold et al. [7] has provided further evidence for the
neural processing time view (Figure 2). In this study, the
magnitudes of so-called ‘contingent aftereffects’ were used
as the dependent measure in place of temporal order
judgements. After watching a slowly rotating stimulus, a
static stimulus appears to move in the opposite direction.
This is a motion aftereffect. The aftereffect can be made
contingent on colour by alternating between a clockwise red
pattern and an anticlockwise green pattern. Subsequently,
static green patterns appear to rotate clockwise and static
red patterns appear to rotate anticlockwise.
Arnold et al. [7] systematically varied the relative phase of
the motion and colour alternations and measured the
magnitudes of the contingent aftereffects. The maximum
contingent aftereffects arose for conditions in which the
colour change and direction change were physically syn-
chronised. However, the minimum aftereffects did not
occur when the colour and motion changes were 90 degrees
out of phase, as would be expected if colour and motion
processing was in perfect temporal synchrony. When a
range of relative phases were tested the average delay, as
indicated by the centroid of the phase function, fell
around 60–90 milliseconds away from the point of physical
synchrony in the direction consistent with a delay in the
neural processing of the motion change signal.
This result appears to provide convincing support for
Moutoussis and Zeki’s [1] finding that colour is processed
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Figure 3
A motion delay could give rise to different
strength of association between colour and
motion, but another possibility is that there is a
temporal asymmetry in the strength of the
linkage. Either situation could generate
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faster than motion. Arnold et al. [7] propose that temporal
binding, as indicated by contingent aftereffects, reflects
these neural processing delays. However, the physiological
basis of contingent aftereffects is not well understood and
caveats may be applied. There is an implicit assumption
that contingent aftereffects will be greatest when the
colour and motion changes are processed synchronously.
More importantly, there is an assumption that when the
colour and motion changes are 90° out of phase — that is,
when for both clockwise and anticlockwise motion the
colour is green for half the time and red for the other half
— then the contingent effects precisely cancel each other
out, so that the aftereffect function crosses zero at the
90° and 270° points. A relative temporal phase shift from
this null point will strengthen the link between, say, green
and clockwise. An asymmetry in contingent adaptation
could have exactly the same effect without a phase shift
however, if for example the motion direction, clockwise
say, at the start of a colour segment, green say, is more
effectively linked to the colour than the motion, anticlock-
wise, at the end of the colour segment (Figure 3). Interest-
ingly, this explanation predicts maximum contingent
aftereffects for synchronous patterns rather than for time-
shifted patterns.
The colour contingent motion aftereffect may reflect a
change in sensitivity of neurons responsive to both a
particular colour and direction of motion, or an increase in
mutual inhibition between neurons sensitive to colour and
those sensitive to motion. Arnold et al. [7] do not make any
specific suggestions in their paper about how the colour
and motion information is combined in the generation of
the contingent aftereffect. If it is necessary to combine
information in a single cell or area, then this would be
inconsistent with the picture of distributed asynchronous
activation (implicit brain time) offered by Moutoussis and
Zeki [1]. However, if there is no explicit neural connection,
then it may difficult to explain how the contingencies arise.
Temporal judgements, like judgements of spatial relation-
ships, require us to interrogate our experience. We have to
establish a perceptual routine to recover the information
necessary for the task. But contingent aftereffects are auto-
matic and appear sensitive to the temporal contingencies
of neural processing. They therefore provide an important
tool by which to investigate temporal processing in the
visual system. However, the advantages of using an indi-
rect measure of temporal processing need to be balanced
against the disadvantages. We still need to establish
whether these adaptation effects result from differences in
processing time that directly influence our perception of
the relative time of occurrence of external events.
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